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Abstract
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorpo-
rate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked en-
vironments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics.
We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In
particular, we study Lp norms and analyze the existence and complexity
of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost
tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the
set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash
equilibria.
1 Introduction
Modern networked environments often lack a central authority that has the
ability or the necessary information to coordinate the allocation of resources such
as bandwidths of network links, server capacities, cloud computing resources,
etc. Hence, allocation decisions are delegated to local entities or customers.
Often they are interested in allocations that optimize for themselves rather
than for overall system performance. We study the strategic interaction that
arises in such situations using game theoretic methods.
The class of congestion games [30] is a well-known model to study scenarios
in which the players allocate shared resources. In a congestion game each player
chooses a subset of resources from a collection of allowed subsets which are called
strategies. These resources may represent links in a network, servers, switches,
etc. Each resource is equipped with a cost function that is mapping from the
number of players using it to a cost value. The cost of a player is the sum of
the costs of the resources in the chosen strategy. There are several well-known
extensions to this model. In weighted congestion games [17], players can have
different weights and the cost of a resource depends on the total weight of the
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players using it. In player-specific congestion games [28], the costs of resources
can be different for different players.
However, all these models have in common that the cost of a player is defined
as the sum of the resource costs. This is well-suited to describe latencies or delays
of computer or traffic networks, for example. However, in scenarios in which
bandwidth determines the costs of players this is determined by the bottleneck
link. To that end, bottleneck congestion games have been introduced [5] in
which the cost of a player is defined as the cost of her most expensive resource.
Both models are limited in their ability to model complementarities that
naturally arise in scenarios where the performance of a resource depends to
some degree on the performance of other resources. For example, a cloud-based
web application may be comprised of many resources. A low performing re-
source negatively influences the performance of other parts and hence the over-
all system. Bottleneck games assume perfect complements, whereas standard
congestion games assume independence. We seek to generalize both models and
allow for different degrees of complementarity that may even differ between play-
ers. We are inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) [4, 12], which are a well-studied and accepted model in economics. We
adapt the notion to our needs and study the analogue version for cost functions
that corresponds to Lp norms. Clearly, both standard congestion games and
bottleneck congestion games are special cases of these games with L1 and L∞
norms, respectively. Using further aggregation functions instead of Lp norms
even allows to model more complex dependencies. Based on natural monotonic-
ity properties of these functions, we can characterize the existence of pure Nash
equilibria.
1.1 Related Work
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal [30] who shows that these
games are potential games. In fact, the class is isomorphic to the class of
potential games as shown by Monderer and Shapley [29]. The price of anarchy
in the context of network congestion games was first considered by Koutsopias
and Papadimitriou [24]. The related concept of smoothness, which can be used
to derive a bound on the price of anarchy, was introduced by Roughgarden [31].
Fabrikant et al. [14] show that in congestion games improvement sequences may
have exponential length, and that it is in general PLS-complete to compute a
pure Nash equilibrium. Chien and Sinclair [10] show that for symmetric conges-
tion games with a mild assumption on the cost function the approximate best-
response dynamics converge quickly to an approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
In contrast to that, Skopalik and Vöcking [33] show that it is in general even
PLS-hard to compute approximate pure Nash equilibria for any polynomially
computable approximation factor. However, if the cost functions are restricted
to linear or constant degree polynomials, approximate pure Nash equilibria can
be computed in polynomial time as shown by Caragiannis et al. [7], even for
weighted games [9] and some other variants [8, 15]. Hansknecht et al. [19] use
the concept of approximate potential functions to examine approximate pure
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Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games under different restrictions on the
cost functions. For polynomial cost functions of maximal degree g they show
that (g + 1)-approximate equilibria are guaranteed to exist.
Singleton congestion games, a class of congestion games which guarantees
polynomial convergence of best-response improvement sequences to pure Nash
equilibria, are considered by Ieong et al. [22]. They show that the property
of polynomial convergence can be generalized to so called independent-resource
congestion games. It is further generalized by Ackermann et al. [2] to ma-
troid congestion games. They show that, for non-decreasing cost functions, the
matroid property is not only sufficient, but also necessary to guarantee the con-
vergence to pure Nash equilibria in polynomial time. Milchtaich [28] studies the
concept of player-specific congestion games and shows that in the singleton case
these games always admit pure Nash equilibria. Ackermann et al. [1] generalize
these results to matroid strategy spaces and show that the result also holds for
weighted congestion games. They also examine the question of efficient com-
putability and convergence towards these equilibria. Furthermore, they point
out that in a natural sense the matroid property is maximal for the guaran-
teed existence of pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion
games. Moreover, Milchtaich [28] examines congestion games in which players
are both weighted and have player-specific cost functions. By constructing a
game with three players he shows that these games, even in the case of single-
ton strategies, do not necessarily possess pure Nash equilibria. Mavronicalas
et al. [27] study a special case of these games in which cost functions are not
entirely player-specific. Instead, the player-specific resource costs are derived
by combining the general resource cost function and a player-specific constant
via a specified operation (e.g. addition or multiplication). They show that
this restriction is sufficient to guarantee the existence of pure Nash-equilibria
in games with three players. Dunkel and Schulz [13] show that the decision
problem whether a weighted network congestion game possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium is NP-hard. For player-specific network congestion games, Acker-
mann and Skopalik [3] show that this problem is NP-complete both in directed
and in undirected graphs.
Banner and Orda [5] introduce the class of bottleneck congestion games and
study their applicability in network routing scenarios. In particular, they derive
bounds on the price of anarchy in network bottleneck congestion games with
restricted cost functions and show that there always exists a pure Nash equi-
librium which is socially optimal, but that the computation of this equilibrium
is NP-hard. Harks et al. [20] give an overview on bottleneck congestion games
and the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria. Moreover, they show
that in matroid bottleneck congestion games even pure strong equilibria, which
are stable against coalitional deviations, can be computed efficiently. Harks et
al. [21] introduce the so called Lexicographical Improvement Property, which
guarantees the existence of pure Nash equilibria through a potential function
argument. They show that bottleneck congestion games fulfill this property.
Feldotto et al. [16] generalize both variants and investigate the linear combi-
nation of standard and bottleneck congestion games. Kukushkin [26] introduces
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the concept of generalized congestion games in which players may use arbitrary
monotonic aggregation functions to calculate their total cost from the costs of
their single resources. He shows that, apart from monotonic mappings, additive
aggregation functions that fulfill certain restrictions are the only ones for which
the existence of PNE can be guaranteed. In a later paper [25], he elaborates this
result by deriving properties for the players’ aggregation functions which are suf-
ficient to establish this guarantee. Another generalization of congestion games
is given by Byde et al. [6] and Voice at al. [34]. They introduce the model of
games with congestion-averse utility functions. They show under which proper-
ties pure Nash equilibria exist and give a polynomial time algorithm to compute
them.
1.2 Our Contribution
We introduce congestion games with Lp-aggregation functions and show that
pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed only if either there is one aggregation value
p for all players or in the case of matroid congestion games. For games with lin-
ear cost functions in which a pure Nash equilibrium exists, we derive bounds on
the price of anarchy. For general games, we show the existence of approximate
pure Nash equilibria where the approximation factor scales sublinearly with the
size of the largest strategy set. We show that this factor is tight and that it is
NP-hard to decide whether there is an approximate equilibrium with a smaller
factor. Computing an approximate PNE with that factor is PLS-hard. As a
positive result, we present two different polynomial time algorithms to compute
approximate equilibria in games with linear cost functions. The approximation
factors of both methods have a different dependence on the parameters of the
game. For matroid games, we show the existence of pure Nash equilibria not
only for Lp-aggregation functions but also seek to extend it to more general ag-
gregation functions. We can characterize the functions that guarantee existence
of PNE by certain monotonicity properties.
1.3 Model/Preliminaries
A congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions is a tuple Γ =
(
N,R, (Σi)i∈N ,
(cr)r∈R , (pi)i∈N
)
. N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players, R = {r1, . . . , rm}
the set of resources. For each player i ∈ N , Σi ⊆ 2
R denotes the strategy space
of player i and pi ∈ R, pi ≥ 1 denotes the player-specific aggregation value
of player i. For each resource r, cr : N → R denotes the non-decreasing cost
function associated to resource r.
In a congestion game, the state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) describes the situation that
each player i ∈ N has chosen the strategy Si ∈ Σi. In state S, we define for
each resource r ∈ R by nr(S) = |{i ∈ N | r ∈ Si}| the congestion of r. The cost
of resource r in state S is defined as cr(S) = cr (nr(S)). The cost of player i is
defined as ci(S) =
(∑
r∈Si
cr(S)
pi
) 1
pi . If for all i, j ∈ N it holds that pi = pj ,
then we call Γ a congestion game with identical Lp-aggregation functions.
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For a state S = (S1, ..., Si, ..., Sn), we denote by (S
′
i, S−i) the state that is
reached if player i plays strategy S′i while all other strategies remain unchanged.
A state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is called a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if for all
i ∈ N and all S′i ∈ Σi it holds that ci(S) ≤ ci(S
′
i, S−i) and a β-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium for a β ≥ 1 if for all i ∈ N and all S′i ∈ Σi it holds
that ci(S) ≤ β · ci(S
′
i, S−i). Additionally, we define the Price of Anarchy as the
worst-case ratio between the costs in any equilibria and the minimal possible
costs in the game. Formally, it is given by
maxS∈PNE
∑
i∈N
ci(S)
minS∈S
∑
i∈N
ci(S∗)
. A game is called
(λ, µ)-smooth for λ > 0 and µ ≤ 1 if, for every pair of states S and S′, we have∑
i∈N ci(S
′
i, S−i) ≤ λ
∑
i∈N ci(S
′)+µ
∑
i∈N ci(S). In a (λ, µ)-smooth game, the
Price of Anarchy is at most λ1−µ [31].
2 Existence and Efficiency of Pure Nash Equilib-
ria
We begin with an easy observation that congestion games in which all players
use the same Lp-norm as aggregation function always possesses a PNE.
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a congestion game with identical Lp-aggregation func-
tions. Then Γ possesses at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
However, if players are heterogeneous in the sense that they use different
aggregation functions a PNE might not exist even for two player games.
Theorem 2. For every 1 ≤ p1 < p2 there exists a 2-player congestion game
with Lp-aggregation functions Γ that does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium.
Now we will investigate the efficiency of the equilibria by analyzing the price
of anarchy. We restrict ourselves to games with linear cost functions and make
use of a previous result by Christodolou et al. [11]. Let q := maxi∈N pi, let d :=
maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si|. Furthermore, let z =
⌊
1
2 ·
(
d1−
1
q +
√
5 + 6 ·
(
d1−
1
q − 1
)
+
(
d1−
1
q − 1
)2)⌋
be the maximum integer such that z
2
z+1 ≤ d
1− 1
q .
Theorem 3. A congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions Γ in which all
cost functions are linear is
(
d1−
1
p · z
2+3z+1
2z+1 , d
1− 1
p · 12z+1
)
-smooth. If Γ possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium, its price of anarchy is bounded by d1−
1
p · z
2+3z+1
2z+1−d
1− 1
p
.
3 Existence of Approximate Pure Nash Equilib-
ria
We start by giving a bound depending on the minimal and maximal pi-values
that players use and the maximal number of resources in a strategy.
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Theorem 4. Let Γ be a congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions, let
p = mini∈N pi be the minimal and q = maxi∈N pi be the maximal aggregation
value in the game. Furthermore, denote by d = maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si| the size of
the strategy that contains most resources. Then Γ contains a β-approximate
equilibrium for β = d
1
2
·( 1p−
1
q ). Moreover, a β-approximate equilibrium will be
reached from an arbitrary state after a finite number of β-improvement steps.
In the proof we show that Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 cr(i)
z is an approximate
potential function where z :=
(
1
2 ·
(
1
p
+ 1
q
))−1
. We will now complement this
result by showing that this approximation quality is the best achievable: i.e.,
we show that for any given p < q and d ≥ 2 we can construct a game which
possesses no β-approximate PNE for any β < d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
Theorem 5. Let p, q, d ∈ N with p < q and d ≥ 2. Then there is a congestion
game with Lp-aggregation functions Γ with N = {1, 2}, p1 = p, p2 = q, and
d = maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si| such that Γ does not possess a β-approximate pure Nash
equilibrium for any β < d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
We complete the discussion of approximate pure Nash equilibria by regarding
the computational complexity of deciding whether an approximate PNE exists
for any approximation factor smaller than β.
Theorem 6. For any p, q, d ∈ N with p < q and d ≥ 2 it is NP-hard to
decide whether a given congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions Γ, with
p ≤ pi ≤ q for all i ∈ N , and d = maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si| possesses a β-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium for any β < d
1
2
·( 1p−
1
q ).
4 Computation of Approximate Equilibria
In [33] it was shown that it is PLS-hard to compute an β-approximate PNE in
standard congestion games. Since these games are a special case of congestion
games with Lp-aggregation functions, this negative result immediately carries
over to congestion games with Lp-aggregation functions.
Proposition 7. It is PLS-hard to compute a β-approximate pure Nash equi-
librium in a congestion game Γ with Lp-aggregation functions in which all cost
functions are non-negative and non-decreasing, for any β that is computable in
polynomial time.
In the light of this initial negative result, we consider games with restricted
cost functions. Caragiannis et al. [7] provide an algorithm that computes ap-
proximate pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with polynomial cost func-
tions. For linear costs, the algorithm achieves an approximation quality of 2+ ǫ.
For polynomial functions with a maximal degree of g, the algorithm guarantees
an approximation factor of gO(g). We will reuse the algorithmic idea in two
different ways which yield to different approximation guarantees depending on
the aggregation parameters pi.
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Theorem 8. Let Γ be a congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions in which
all cost functions are linear or polynomial functions of degree at most g without
negative coefficients. Furthermore, let p := mini∈N pi, let q := maxi∈N pi, let
d := maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si|, and z =
(
1
2 ·
(
1
p
+ 1
q
))−1
.
Then an β-approximate equilibrium of Γ can be computed in polynomial time
for β = min
{
(2 + ǫ) · d1−
1
q , zO(1) · d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )
}
(linear cost functions) and for
β = min
{
gO(g) · d1−
1
q , (g · z)O(g) · d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )
}
(polynomial cost functions).
Proof. We apply the algorithm proposed by Caragiannis et al. [7] to Γ, dis-
regarding the aggregation values. Since all cost functions are either linear or
polynomial, the algorithm computes either a (2 + ǫ)- or a gO(g)-approximate
equilibrium. Now we can use the proof of Theorem 4 (for z = 1). We get
that in the state computed by the algorithm, which would be a either (2 + ǫ)-
or gO(g)-approximate PNE if all players used the L1-norm, no player i can
improve her costs according to the Lpi-norm by more than a factor of either
(2 + ǫ) · d
1− 1
pi ≤ β or gO(g) · d
1− 1
pi ≤ β . Hence, the computed state is an
β-approximate pure Nash equilibrium in Γ. As analyzed in [7], the running
time of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of Γ and 1
ǫ
. For the second
approximation factor and linear costs functions we replace every c(x) in Γ by
a polynomial cost function c′(x) = c(x)z of degree z, where for simplicity z is
assumed to be integral. For this game, the algorithm given in [7] computes a
state S which is a zO(z)-approximate equilibrium. The costs of all players are
equal to the costs they would have in Γ if they accumulated their costs according
to the Lz-norm without taking the z-th root. Following the argumentation of
the proof of Theorem 4, we get for any player i and any strategy S′i ∈ Σi:
ci(S)
ci(S′i, S−i)
≤
((
zO(z)
) pi
z
) 1
pi
·
(
d
pi
z
−1
) 1
pi
= zO(1) · d
1
z
− 1
pi ≤ zO(1) · d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
Obviously, the transformation of the cost functions can be done in polynomial
time. Hence, the algorithm given in [7] computes a zO(1) ·d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )-approximate
equilibrium of Γ in polynomial time. For polynomial cost functions this will lead
to a game with polynomial cost functions of a degree of at most g · z. Hence,
the algorithm from [7] computes a (g · z)O(g·z)-approximate PNE. Following the
reasoning of the proof, we get that the computed state is a (g · z)O(g) · d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )-
approximate PNE of the congestion game with Lp-aggregation functions.
We have derived two different upper bounds for the approximation quality
of approximate equilibria that can be computed in polynomial time. Generally
speaking, if d is small but players use high aggregation values, the first strategy
yields the better approximation, while otherwise the second bound is better.
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5 General Aggregation Functions in Matroid
Games
In this section we extend our model to a more general class of aggregation
functions. Instead of using the Lp norms in the cost functions of the player, they
are now defined by ci(S) = fi (cr1(S), cr2(S), . . . , crm) with fi being an arbitrary
aggregation function for each player based on certain monotonicity properties.
We now consider only matroid congestion games in which the strategy spaces
of all players form the bases of a matroid on the set of resources.
Let f : Rd → R be a function that is defined on non-decreasingly ordered
vectors. Let for all b = (b1, . . . , bd) and b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
d) with bi ≤ b
′
i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ d hold that f(b) ≤ f(b′). Then f is called strongly monotone. Let
x = (x1, . . . , xd) and y = (y1, . . . , yd) be vectors that differ in only one element,
i.e., there are indices j and k such that xi = yi for all i < j and i > k, xj < yk,
and xi+1 = yi for all j ≤ i < k and f(y) < f(x). Furthermore, let there be a vec-
tor z = (z1, . . . , zd−1) such that f(z1, . . . , xj , . . . , zd−1) < f(z1, . . . , yk, . . . , zd−1)
(with xj and yk at their correct positions in the non-decreasingly ordered vec-
tors). Then f is called a strongly non-monotone function. If f is not strongly
non-monotone, then f is called a weakly monotone function. We remark that
this definition of vectors that differ in only one element does not require these
elements to be at the same position in the vectors (the case j = k). It is suffi-
cient that the symmetric difference of the multisets containing all elements in x
and y contains exactly two elements xj and yk.
Theorem 9. Let Γ be a matroid congestion game in which each player has a
personal cost aggregation function fi according to which her costs are calculated
from her single resource costs. If for all players i ∈ N the aggregation function
fi is strongly monotone, then Γ contains a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that any strategy Si = {r1, . . . , rd} that minimizes
the sum
∑d
j=1 cri(S) in a state S also minimizes the cost fi (ci(S)), where ci(S)
denotes the non-decreasingly ordered vector of resource costs of player i in state
S. Then a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed by computing a PNE in the
corresponding game in which all players use the L1-norm. We can show that
if B = {b1, . . . , bd} is a matroid basis that is minimal w.r.t. the sum
∑d
i=1 bi,
then for any other basis B′ = {b′1, . . . , b
′
d} and all 1 ≤ i ≤ d it holds that bi ≤ b
′
i
(w.l.o.g. assume that both B and B′ are written in non-decreasing order).
Hence, if B is a basis that is optimal w.r.t. sum costs, then for all other bases
B′ it holds that f(B) ≤ f(B′), since f is a strongly monotone function.
Since all Lp norms are monotone functions, we can extend this result to
congestion games with Lp norms:
Corollary 10. Let Γ be a matroid congestion game with Lp norms, then Γ
contains a pure Nash equilibrium.
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We have shown that strongly monotone aggregation functions are sufficient
to guarantee the existence of a PNE in matroid congestion games with player-
specific aggregation functions. This immediately gives rise to the question whe-
ther the monotonicity criterion is also necessary to achieve this guarantee. We
investigate this question by examining if, given a non-monotone aggregation
function f , we can construct a matroid congestion game in which all players
use f and which does not contain a PNE. For singletons, we can immediately
give a negative answer to this. Since in this case costs can be associated to
single resources and all players use the same aggregation function, Rosenthal’s
potential function argument [30] is applicable and shows that a PNE necessarily
exists. However, for matroid degrees of at least 2 the answer is positive if the
aggregation function fulfills the property that we call strong non-monotonicity.
Theorem 11. Let f : Rd → R, d ≥ 2 be a strongly non-monotone function.
Then there is a 2-player matroid congestion game in which both players allocate
matroids of degree d and use the aggregation function f , which does not contain
a pure Nash equilibrium.
As argued, it is reasonable to demand that the aggregation function f in
the proof is strongly non-monotone. We will underline this by showing that the
strong non-monotonicity actually is a sharp criterion: i.e., it is both sufficient
and necessary to construct a game without a PNE from f .
Theorem 12. Let f be an aggregation function that is weakly monotone and let
Γ be a matroid congestion game in which all players use f as their aggregation
function. Then Γ possesses a pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, from every
state there is a sequence of best-response improvement steps that reaches a pure
Nash equilibrium after a polynomial number of steps.
Proof. Since f is weakly monotone, we have for all vectors vx and vy which
differ in exactly one component (let vx contain x and vy contain y, with x < y)
that either f(vx) ≤ f(vy) or f(vy) < f(vx) and for any vector wy that contains
y it holds that f(wy) ≤ f(wx), where wx results from wy by replacing y by
x. Hence, for all pairs (x, y) we have either f(wx) ≤ f(wy) for all wx and
wy, or f(wy) ≤ f(wx) for all wx and wy . This means that if we replace one
element by another one in an arbitrary vector, the direction in which the value
of f changes (if it changes at all) depends only on the two exchanged elements,
not on the rest of the vector. Based on this, we define the relation ≤′ on the
real numbers by determining that x ≤′ y if and only if f(wx) ≤ f(wy) for
all vectors wx and wy. As argued, this relation defines a total preorder on R.
Since the number of resources and players in the game Γ are finite, the number
of different resource costs that can occur in the game is also finite. Hence, it
is possible to enumerate all possible resource costs according to the ordering
relation ≤′. We denote the position of the cost value cr(S) in this enumeration
by π(cr(S)): i.e., π(cr(S)) = 1 if and only if for all r
′ ∈ R and all l ∈ N it
holds that cr(S) ≤
′ cr′(l). We have that π(cr(S)) = π(cr′(S
′)) if and only if
cr(S) ≤
′ cr′(S
′) and cr′(S
′) ≤′ cr(S). We remark that ≤
′ is not necessarily a
total order. Thus the two cost values need not be equal in this case.
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Using this, we define the potential function Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 π(cr(S)).
Consider a state S = (Si, S−i) in which player i can improve her cost by de-
viating to the strategy S′i, yielding the state S
′ = (S′i, S−i). Since Si and
S′i are both bases of the same matroid M , the graph G = (V,E) with V =
(Si \ S
′
i ∪ S
′
i \ Si) and E = {{r, r
′} | r ∈ Si, r
′ ∈ S′i, S
′
i \ {r
′} ∪ {r} ∈M} con-
tains a perfect matching (see Corollary 39.12a in [32]). All edges in G correspond
to resource pairs {r, r′} such that S′i \ {r
′} ∪ {r} is a valid strategy for player
i. Since S′i is a best response strategy to the strategy profile S−i of all other
players, it must hold for all edges {r, r′} that f(S′i\{r
′}∪{r}, S−i) ≥ f(S
′
i, S−i).
This implies that either cr′(S
′) ≤′ cr(S) or f(S
′
i \ {r
′} ∪ {r}, S−i) = f(S
′
i, S−i)
and cr′(S
′) > cr(S). In the latter case, the strategy S
′
i \ {r
′} ∪ {r} is still a
best-response strategy for player i. Repeating the argument yields that there
must be a best-response strategy S′′i such that in the graph defined analogously
to G it holds for all edges {r, r′} that cr′(S
′′) ≤′ cr(S), where S
′′ = (S′′i , S−i).
Let T = {e1, . . . , ek} be a perfect matching in this graph. For all {r, r
′} ∈ T
it holds that cr′(S
′′) ≤′ cr(S), and hence π(cr′(S
′′)) ≤ π(cr(S)). We have to ar-
gue that T contains at least one edge {r, r′} with π(cr′(S
′′)) < π(cr(S)). Assume
that for all {r, r′} ∈ T it held that π(cr′(S
′)) = π(cr(S)), i.e., cr(S) ≤
′ cr′(S
′′).
Then we could transform Si into S
′′
i by iteratively exchanging a single resource
r for another resource r′. Since two consecutive sets Sr and Sr
′
in this se-
quence differ only in the resources r and r′, and cr(S) ≤
′ cr′(S
′), it holds
that f(Sr) ≤ f(Sr
′
). Hence, none of the steps decreases the value of f , which
contradicts the assumption that f(S′′i , S−i) ≤ f(S
′
i, S−i) < f(Si, S−i). There-
fore, there must be at least one edge {r, r′} in T with π(cr′(S
′′)) < π(cr(S)),
which implies Φ(S′′) − Φ(S) =
∑
r′∈S′′
i
\Si
π(cr′(S
′′)) −
∑
r∈Si\S′′i
π(cr(S)) =∑
{r,r′}∈T (π(c
′
r(S
′′))− π(cr(S))) < 0. By construction, the value of Φ is always
integral and upper bounded by n2 ·m2, where n is the number of players and m
the number of resources in Γ. Hence, Γ reaches a PNE from an arbitrary state
after at most n2 ·m2 best-response improvement steps.
The theorem states that strong non-monotonicity is necessary to construct
a game without a PNE from a single aggregation function f . However, the
technique used in the proof only requires that all aggregation functions used in
the game have the same order on vectors which differ in exactly one compo-
nent. It is irrelevant how these functions order vectors which differ in several
components.
Corollary 13. Let Γ be a matroid congestion game in which the costs of player
i are computed according to her personal aggregation function fi. If for all i ∈ N
the function fi is weakly monotone and for all i, j ∈ N and all vectors v and w
that differ in exactly one component it holds that fi(v) ≤ fi(w)⇔ fj(v) ≤ fj(w),
then Γ possesses a pure Nash equilibrium.
This corollary is interesting mainly because it establishes an almost tight
border up to which the existence of PNE can be guaranteed. If we are given two
aggregation functions f and g and two vectors v and w that differ in exactly one
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component, with f(v) < f(w) and g(w) < g(v), then it is obvious that we can
construct a 2-player game in which the first player uses the aggregation function
f and the second g and the two players alternate between the cost vectors v and
w, as we did in the proof of Theorem 11 for strongly non-monotone functions.
6 Conclusion
For congestion games with Lp-aggregation functions, we presented methods to
compute approximate PNE and bound the price of anarchy which are based
on previous results regarding standard congestion games. It is an open point
for future work to examine if these results could be improved by specifically
designing methods for congestion games with Lp-aggregation functions. Another
interesting approach for further research would be to combine the application of
aggregation functions with other classes of congestion games such as weighted
congestion games or non-atomic congestion games, and examine the implications
for the (approximate) pure Nash equilibria in these games.
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Appendix
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let Γ be a congestion game in which all players use the aggregation
function Lp for some p ∈ R. Then Γ can be replaced by the equivalent standard
congestion game Γ′ with cost functions c′r(S) = cr(S)
p. The cost of player i
in state S in Γ is equal to ci(S) = c
′
i(S)
1
p . Since it is a strictly increasing
function, taking the p-th root is strictly monotone, and thus every best-response
strategy in Γ′ is also a best-response strategy in Γ. Since pure Nash equilibria
are guaranteed to exist in standard congestion games [30], we can conclude that
Γ′ possesses a PNE, which implies that Γ possesses a PNE as well.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove the statement by constructing for any arbitrary p = p1 and
q = p2 a game as described in the theorem. Let p, q ∈ N with q > p, and
z := q+p2 . Consider the following game:
Γ = (N,R, (Σi)i∈N , (cr)r∈R , (pi)i∈N ) with N = {1, 2}, R = {r1, . . . , r6},
Σ1 = {{r1, r3, r5}, {r2, r4, r6}}, Σ2 = {{r1, r3, r6}, {r2, r4, r5}}, crj (1) = 0 for
1 ≤ j ≤ 6, crj (2) = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, and crj (2) = 2
1
z for j ∈ {5, 6}, p1 = p and
p2 = q.
The strategy spaces are constructed in such a way that in every state both
players share either two resources (r1 and r3 or r2 and r4) or exactly one resource
(r5 or r6). The resources r5 and r6 are more expensive; since player one has the
lower pi-value, she will be more willing to share the more expensive resource,
while the player with the higher pi-value will be more willing to share a higher
number of resources. We will now analyze the costs of the players in the different
states, disregarding the pi-th root that is taken in the computation of the Lp-
norm, since it does not influence the pure Nash equilibria.
Let S1 be a state in which the players share exactly one resource, and S2 a
state in which they share two resources. Since p < z and q > z, we get:
c1(S1) =
(
2
1
z
)p
= 2
p
z < 2 = c1(S2) and c2(S1) =
(
2
1
z
)q
= 2
q
z > 2 = c2(S2)
Hence, player 1 prefers states in which only one resource is shared, whereas
player 2 prefers states in which two cheaper resources are shared. Since both
players can deviate from a state equivalent to S1 to an S2-state, and vice versa,
none of the states of this game is a pure Nash equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. For the proof, we use the smoothness result by Christodolou et al. [11]
for an arbitrary z ∈ N. Furthermore, we apply the fact that the cost of any
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player in any state is at most the cost she would incur according to the L1-norm,
and the fact that the cost according to the Lp-norm is at least d
1
p
−1 times the
L1-cost.
For a state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and a player i we denote by c
1
i (S) =
∑
r∈Si
cr(S)
the cost of player i according to the L1-norm and we denote by cost
1(S) =∑
i∈N c
1
i (S) the total cost of all players in state S according to the L1-norm.
For any two states S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and S
′ = (S′1, . . . , S
′
n) and any z ∈ N, we
get:
∑
i∈N
ci(S
′
i, S−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
c1i (S
′
i, S−i) ≤
z2 + 3z + 1
2z + 1
· cost1(S′) +
1
2z + 1
· cost1(S)
≤ d1−
1
p ·
z2 + 3z + 1
2z + 1
· cost(S′) +
d1−
1
p
2z + 1
· cost(S),
which proves that Γ is
(
d1−
1
p · z
2+3z+1
2z+1 , d
1− 1
p · 12z+1
)
-smooth. Since every (λ, µ)-
smooth game has a price of anarchy of at most λ1−µ , this implies that the price of
anarchy of Γ is bounded by d1−
1
p · z
2+3z+1
2z+1−d
1− 1
p
, for every z ∈ N with 2z+1 > d1−
1
p .
In particular, this holds for the value of z =
⌊
1
2 ·
(
d1−
1
p +
√
5 + 6 · (d1−
1
p − 1)
+(d1−
1
p − 1)2
)⌋
given in the theorem, which according to [11] is optimal with
respect to the achieved bound on the price of anarchy.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let z :=
(
1
2 ·
(
1
p
+ 1
q
))−1
. We prove the statement by showing that the
function Φ defined as Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 cr(i)
z is a β-approximate potential
function: i.e., whenever a player improves her personal cost by more than a
factor of β, the value of Φ is bound to decrease. This definition is a slight
variation of Rosenthal’s potential function [30]. It has the property that its
value decreases whenever a player performs a change in strategy which would
be beneficial if her costs were aggregated according to the Lz-norm.
As we will show, a player can improve her cost in any state by at most
a factor of β without decreasing her cost according to the Lz-norm. Hence,
if a player improves by more than a factor of β, she also improves her cost
according to the Lz-norm. Due to the definition of Φ, this implies that the
value of Φ decreases, which yields the theorem.
Until the last step of the proof, we disregard the fact that players take
the pi-th root of their cumulated costs (and pretend that the cost of player
i in state S = (Si, S−i) was
∑
r∈Si
cr(S)
pi). We denote by czi (Si, S−i) =∑
r∈Si
cr(Si, S−i)
z the cost of player i in state (Si, S−i) if it was computed
according to the Lz-norm (i.e. pi = z). Consider a player i with aggregation
value pi in state S = (Si, S−i). Assume that i can improve her cost by deviating
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to a state S′ = (S′i, S−i) without improving her costs according to the Lz-norm,
i.e. ci(S
′) < ci(S), but c
z
i (S
′) ≥ czi (S).
We now distinguish between the cases pi ≤ z and pi ≥ z.
For the case of pi ≥ z, we get:
ci(S
′
i, S−i) =
∑
r∈S′
i
cr(S
′
i, S−i)
pi =
∑
r∈S′
i
(cr(S
′
i, S−i)
z)
pi
z
≥
∑
r∈S′
(
1
|S′i|
· czi (S
′
i, S−i)
) pi
z
≥ |S′i| ·
(
1
|S′i|
· czi (S)
) pi
z
.
The first inequality holds since the value of
∑k
i=1 x
l
i for fixed x1 + · · ·+ xk and
l ≥ 1 is minimized if xi = xj holds for all i and j. The second inequality is
correct since by assumption it holds that czi (S
′
i, S−i) ≥ c
z
i (S).
On the other hand, we have
ci(S) =
∑
r∈Si
cr(S)
pi =
∑
r∈Si
(cr(S)
z)
pi
z ≤
(∑
r∈Si
cr(S)
z
) pi
z
= czi (S)
pi
z .
Putting things together, we get
ci(S)
ci(S′i, S−i)
≤
|S′i|
pi
z · czi (S)
pi
z
|S′i| · c
z
i (S)
pi
z
≤
d
pi
z
d
= d
pi
z
−1.
We now regard the case pi ≤ z, which implies
pi
z
≤ 1.
Analogously to the first case, we use that for fixed x1+ · · ·+xk and l ≤ 1 the
value of
∑k
i=1 x
l
i is minimized if xi = xj holds for all i and j and maximized if
all but one summand are 0. This is a direct reversal of the properties for l ≥ 1.
Thus, following the same line of argument as in the first case, we get
ci(S
′
i, S−i) ≥ c
z
i (S)
pi
z and
ci(S) ≤ |Si| ·
(
1
|Si|
· czi (S)
) pi
z
≤ d ·
(
1
d
· czi (S)
) pi
z
, which implies
ci(S)
ci(S′i, S−i)
≤
d
d
pi
z
= d1−
pi
z
Now we will take into account that players take the pi-th root of their cumu-
lated costs. This makes a big difference for approximate equilibria, since every
γ-improvement step in the game without taking roots corresponds to a γ
1
pi -
improvement step in the original game. We denote by coi (S) the cost of player
i in the original game. Using the definition of z, we analyze this for both cases
separately, starting with pi ≥ z.
coi (S)
coi (S
′
i, S−i)
≤
(
d
pi
z
−1
) 1
pi
= d
1
z
− 1
pi ≤ d
1
z
− 1
q = d
1
2
·( 1p+
1
q )−
1
q = d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )
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Analogously, we get for the case of pi ≤ z:
coi (S)
coi (S
′
i, S−i)
≤
(
d1−
pi
z
) 1
pi
= d
1
pi
− 1
z ≤ d
1
p
− 1
z = d
1
p
− 1
2
·( 1p+
1
q ) = d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q )
This shows that no player can improve her cost by more than a factor of β =
d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ) without decreasing her cost with respect to the Lz-norm. Hence, every
β-improvement step of any player decreases the value of Φ. This implies that
sequences of β-improvement steps can not contain cycles and therefore reach a
β-approximate equilibrium after a finite number of steps.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. For any given p < q, we define z :=
(
1
2 ·
(
1
p
+ 1
q
))−1
. Based on this,
we construct the following 2-player congestion game Γ with N = {1, 2}, R =
{r11, r
2
1 , r
1
2 , r
2
2 , . . . , r
1
d, r
2
d}, Σ1 =
{
{r11, r
1
2 , . . . , r
1
d−1, r
1
d}, {r
2
1, r
2
2 , . . . , r
2
d−1, r
2
d}
}
,
Σ2 =
{
{r11, r
1
2 , . . . , r
1
d−1, r
2
d}, {r
2
1, r
2
2 , . . . , r
2
d−1, r
1
d}
}
, crk
j
(0) = 0 and crk
j
(1) = 1
for 1 ≤ j ≤ d − 1 and k ∈ {1, 2}, crk
d
(0) = 1 and crk
d
(1) = d
1
z for k ∈ {1, 2},
p1 = p and p2 = q.
We first remark that d is indeed the size of the strategy containing most
resources (actually, all strategies have cardinality d). Due to the construction
of the strategy sets, in every state both players either share the d− 1 resources
r
j
1, . . . , r
j
d−1 or only the resource r
j
d for a j ∈ {1, 2}.
In the former case, player 1 incurs a cost of d
1
p and player 2 a cost of d
1
q .
In the latter case, both players incur a cost of d
1
z , which is better for player
1, but worse for player 2. Hence, when deviating to the more preferable state,
player 1 improves her cost by a factor of d
1
p
d
1
z
= d
1
p
− 1
z = d
1
p
− 1
2
·( 1p+
1
q ) = d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
Likewise, in the opposite direction player 2 improves her cost by a factor of
d
1
z
− 1
q = d
1
2
·( 1p+
1
q )−
1
q = d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
Starting in an arbitrary state, both players will alternate between the two
types of states. In every improvement step the respective player improves her
cost by a factor of d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ). This shows that Γ contains no β-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium for any β < d
1
2 (
1
p
− 1
q ).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We prove the statement for d ≥ 3. Afterwards, we will shortly point
out which modifications are necessary for the case d = 2. We reduce from
the independent set problem. Since the size of the players’ strategies may not
exceed d, we use the independent set problem on graphs with bounded node
degrees (ISb). It is NP-complete for degrees of at least 3 [18]. Since d ≥ 3,
we can reduce from ISd, which ensures |Ev| ≤ d for all v ∈ V . Let z =
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(
1
2 ·
(
1
p
+ 1
q
))−1
. For any instance 〈G = (V,E), k〉, we construct a congestion
game with Lp-aggregation functions Γ as follows:
Γ = (N,R, (Σi)i∈N , (cr)r∈R , (pi)i∈N ):
N = {1, . . . , k, c, k + 1, k + 2},
R = {re | e ∈ E} ∪ {r
1
1 , r
2
1 , . . . , r
1
d, r
2
d, rc},
Σi = {{re | e ∈ Ev} | v ∈ V } ∪ {{rc}} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Σc = {{rc}, {r
1
d, r
2
d}},
Σk+1 = {{r
1
1, . . . , r
1
d−1, r
1
d}, {r
2
1, . . . , r
2
d−1, r
2
d}},
Σk+2 = {{r
1
1, . . . , r
1
d−1, r
2
d}, {r
2
1, . . . , r
2
d−1, r
1
d}},
cre(1) = 0 and cre(x) = 2 · d
3 for x ≥ 1 and for all e ∈ E,
crc(1) = 0 and crc(x) = 2 · d
2 for x ≥ 1,
c
r
j
l
= (0, 1) for 1 ≤ l ≤ d− 1 and j ∈ {1, 2},
c
r
j
d
= (0, 1, d
1
z ) for j ∈ {1, 2},
pk+2 = q and pi = p for all other players.
If the connection player c does not interfere in the sub game defined by the
players k+1 and k+2, the state
(
{r11, . . . , r
1
d}, {r
2
1, . . . , r
2
d−1, r
1
d}
)
is a PNE, since
both players have a cost of 1, which can not be improved. On the other hand,
if c allocates r1d and r
2
d, the game is equivalent to the game used in the proof of
Theorem 5, which does not possess a β-approximate PNE for any β < d
1
2
·( 1p−
1
q ).
Obviously, if the k node players allocate disjoint edge sets, all of them and
the connection player have a cost of 0 without interfering in the sub game of
player k+1 and k+2. If two players allocate non-disjoint edge sets, they incur
a cost of at least 2 · d3, which can be improved by a factor of at least d by
allocating rc. In this case, it is beneficial for player c to join the sub game of
player k + 1 and k + 2 and annihilate the existence of a PNE in this game. By
doing so, player c improves her cost by a factor of at least 2·d
2
2·d = d.
In summary, Γ possesses a state in which no player can improve by a factor
of at least d
1
2
·( 1p−
1
q ) if and only if G contains an independent set of size k. This
concludes the proof for d > 2. We will now shortly discuss the case d = 2, which
has to be handled separately since the independent set problem is not NP-hard
for graphs with node degrees of at most 2.
However, we can reduce from IS3 by introducing auxiliary resources and
players. For every node v with three edges e1, e2 and e3, we introduce a node
player v and a resource rv. The strategies available to v are given by {rv},
{re2 , re3} and {rc}. In the strategy sets of the k original node players, we
replace Ev by {rv, re1}. The cost function of rv is defined to be equal to the
costs of the edge resources.
Given this, we can construct a PNE in Γ from an independent set of size k
as follows:
• For any node v that is part of the independent set one player chooses her
strategy Ev or, if v has degree 3, the strategy {rv, re1}.
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• All auxiliary node players for a node v play their strategy {e2, e3} if v is
part of the independent set, and {rv} otherwise.
In the described state all node players incur a cost of 0 and none of them
allocates rc. Thus, a PNE is established if player c allocates rc and does not
interfere in the sub game containing the players k + 1 and k + 2.
On the other hand, if G does not contain an independent set of size k, it holds
in every state that two node players allocate the resource rv for the same node
v or the resource re for the same edge e, or at least one node player allocates rc.
As described for d ≥ 3, this implies that in every state at least one player can
improve her cost by a factor of at least d
1
2
·( 1p−
1
q ), which completes the proof for
all d ≥ 2.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. We proof the statement by using the vectors in the definition of strongly
non-monotone functions in order to construct a game that is equivalent to the
well-known “matching pennies” game (cf. e.g. [23]). Let x, y, z, j, and k be
defined as in the definition. We define the following game with two players:
N = {1, 2}, R = {r11, . . . , r
1
d−1, r
2
1 , . . . , r
2
d−1, rh, rt},
Σ1 =
{
{r11 , . . . , r
1
d−1, rh}, {r
1
1, . . . , r
1
d−1, rt}
}
,
Σ2 =
{
{r21 , . . . , r
2
d−1, rh}, {r
2
1, . . . , r
2
d−1, rt}
}
,
c(r1i ) = (xi) for i < j and c(r
1
i ) = (xi+1) for i ≥ j,
c(r2i ) = (zi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1,
c(rh) = c(rt) = (xj , yk).
Clearly, both Σ1 and Σ2 form the sets of the bases of a matroid. For the first
player, it is preferable to use rh if the second player uses rh, and rt if player 2
uses rt, since f(x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xk, yk, xk+1, . . . , xd) < f(x1, . . . , xd). On
the other hand, player 2 prefers to allocate the resource different from player 1,
since f(z1, . . . , xj , . . . , zd−1) < f(z1, . . . , yk, . . . , zd−1). Hence, none of the four
states of this game is a pure Nash equilibrium.
B Examples Values for the Approximation Fac-
tors
Example values for the two approaches for linear cost functions, based on the
simplifications O(1) = 1 and ǫ = 0:
p q 1st approach 2nd approach
d=2 d=10 d=2 d=10
1 2 2.83 6.32 1.59 2.37
2 3 3.17 9.28 2.54 2.91
1 ∞ 4 20 2.83 6.32
2 ∞ 4 20 4.76 7.11
10 ∞ 4 20 20.71 22.44
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